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Abstract
The Shapash Nuclear Research Institute (SNRI) data book was issued by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2013. The hypothetical facility data book describes the hypothetical site,
which is divided into two areas: the low-security area, known as the administrative area, and the very
high-security area, known as the protected area. The book contains detailed descriptions of each
area’s safety and security measures, along with figures of multiple buildings in both areas, and also
includes information about the site’s computer networks.
This paper aims to identify security weaknesses related to the institute’s location, the Administrative
Area (AA), the Protected Area (PA), and the Instrumentation and Control Technology system (ICT)
within the SNRI and proposes corrective actions to improve the site’s security measures against
malicious acts, based on the IAEA nuclear security series publications, and ultimately proposes a new
layout for the whole site and the research reactor building presenting the changes made, using a
software called Edraw Max.

I.

Introduction

Nuclear and radioactive materials have been significantly useful for humankind in medicine,
agriculture, and industry and for helping states with nuclear power plants to produce electricity and
meet the increased demand of energy supply while having a clean source of energy. Although these
materials are used for pacific purposes, they could also have devastating consequences should they
fall into the hands of criminals and terrorist groups.
The IAEA has issued such a data book, the Hypothetical Facility Data Book: The Shapash Nuclear
Security Research Institute (SNRI), to help member states, experts, and researchers study a
hypothetical nuclear facility to practice nuclear security measures and as an educational tool in
tabletop exercises, workshops, and trainings. The data book describes security measures at different
areas of the facility, with the measures containing vulnerabilities for the reader to discover and learn
from.
Our research developed out of such a tabletop exercise, for which this article is the result. Our article
begins with an overview of the SNRI, describing the administrative area, the protected area, and the

1

International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol. 4 [2018], No. 1, Art. 5
International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol.4, No.1, 2018

computer network. We then identify the various weaknesses relating to the site’s location, the
administrative area, the protected area, and the instrumentation and control system (ICT), and we
propose corrective measures for each weakness. We conclude by suggesting a new site layout for both
the overall facility and the research reactor building.

II.

The Shapash Nuclear Research Institute Site
Overview

The Shapash Nuclear Research Institute is a hypothetical research institute. It is the “Republic of
Anshar’s” first nuclear energy research facility. The facility has two major areas: the administrative
area and the protected area (Fig. 1).
The Administrative Area (AA) is surrounded by a 2.5-meter-high fence. Personnel entering the site
entrance gate must pass through an access control point where they must present badges and be vetted
by the guard, who ensures that the badges are valid. The procedure is repeated for off-hour access.
The personnel phone the guard in the central alarm station (CAS) from a telephone at the gate;
possession of a valid site badge is the only prerequisite for gaining access.
All buildings within the AA are not alarmed—including the radioactive waste site, classified as
category III. The waste site is used for the storage of radioactive waste from various buildings, such as
the research reactor and the fuel fabrication building. The site is under 24-hour surveillance by guards
on foot patrol.
The security officer verifies the decals and badges of vehicles entering the site before allowing access.
A delivery vehicle must present shipping documents to be verified and ensure that the vehicle has a
delivery for the institute, and after a check, the guard makes sure that the recipient is expecting a
delivery; if correct, the vehicle is searched for contraband. Personnel and vehicles exiting the site are
not checked in any way.
The Protected Area (PA): The very high-security area contains the research reactor building, the fuel
fabrication building, support buildings, the oxide storage bunker, the road and rail transportation
terminus, the main cafeteria, and the shipping and receiving building. The area is surrounded by two
2.5-meter-high chain-link fences 5 meters apart, with guards towers located at each corner within the
protected area perimeter. Patrols of the perimeter are carried out by a foot patrol guard on the patrol
road on a random basis.
To access the PA, personnel must pass through metal and radiation detectors in a contraband search.
Items in possession are X-rayed, passing through metal detectors. If an individual fails the metal
detector search, the procedure is repeated. Personnel exiting the PA pass through a radiation portal
monitor, and if no alarm sounds, they continue through the exit door.
A guard verifies vehicles to ensure that the drivers have badges allowing access to the institute, before
a gate permits entry. The guard checks the vehicle for contraband, and once the inspection is
complete, the gate is unlocked, permitting entry of the vehicle to the SNRI-protected area.
The computer network of the facility operates under a system that connects a number of computer
systems, forming a local area network with protocols which control the passing of information.
The research reactor, the fuel fabrication area, and the central alarm station contain sensitive
information and, thus, operate on a red network. The server for the administrative network (the yellow
network), which contains all administrative functions, is located in the administration building.
Information on the green network, also called the general network, is available to the general public.
The plant’s own telecommunication system is used to provide analog and digital connections, but the
unavailability of analog spares forces the site to change to digital ICT. Data threats that the SNRI has
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experienced include hacking attempts, reported by the computer network engineering group, and
intercepted communications from a neighboring country [1].

III. Identification of the SNRI Security Measures’
Weaknesses and Proposed Corrective Actions
In examining the SNRI site, we identified weaknesses relating to the location of the institute, the
administrative area, the protected area at the level of the fuel fabrication building, the research reactor
building, the Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NMAC) organization, contraband detection
equipment, and the shipping and receiving building and the instrumentation and control system ICT.
In the tables below, we discuss these weaknesses and propose corrective actions which, we believe,
can improve access control procedures, the physical protection system of the facility, and information
security.

A.

Location

Weaknesses

Proposed corrective actions

1. • The institute is located in the country’s
capital, which presents crossroads of trading
lanes;

1. • Siting a nuclear facility in a busy city
increases the probability of malicious acts
attempts. A suitable site for a nuclear facility
should be selected prior to designing the facility,
taking into consideration population distribution
and other factors that could comprise security
measures. States with an interest in the
development of nuclear power projects should
also take into consideration multiple criteria for
which consequences of a potential accident
would be at acceptable limits:

• The city’s inhabitants live in poor conditions
and resent the institute.

- The costs are minimized.
- The site characteristics (population
distribution, meteorology, hydrology,
etc.).
- Low probability of phenomena
occurring [2].

B.

Administrative Area

Weaknesses

Proposed corrective actions

1. The site entrance gate is unlocked and open
during normal working hours; intrusion could
occur when guards are absent.

1. The site entrance gate should be locked and
alarmed to prevent and detect any unauthorized
access and to complete the security personnel job.

2. Possession of a valid site badge is the only
requirement for off-hours access, which could
increase unauthorized access.

2. • Technical means and procedures for access
control to authenticate an individual’s identity to
confirm that the name and the personnel
particulars of the individual in question are
correct [3].
• For off-hours access, personnel should have
an authorized slip listing their requisite task, the
area where the task is to be carried out, and the
amount of time needed. Security personnel then
compare the slip’s information with the
information he/she has been informed of in
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advance; if the information matches, the
personnel are escorted to their designated posts.
3. Administrative area buildings are not alarmed,
which could assist adversaries in achieving
malicious acts.

3. Buildings within the AA should be alarmed so
as to detect any intrusion.

4. The radioactive waste site is located within the
AA, a low-security area; unauthorized removal of
nuclear material can be carried out by an insider.

4. The radioactivity waste site shouldn’t be
located within the AA, but rather, in a highersecurity area.

5. Vehicles and personnel exiting the AA are not
checked, making it easy for an insider to leave
the premises with unauthorized materials or
having committed malicious acts.

5. • Vehicles, persons, and packages entering and
exiting the AA should be subject to search for
detection and prevention of unauthorized access.

6. Most senior management personnel have keys
to the outer doors of the administrative buildings,
and access to multiple zones within the site
increases the chance of an insider carrying out a
malicious act.

6. All employees should only have keys to his/her
personnel post; even senior management
personnel could conceivably have malicious
intentions.

C.

• Parking area should be located farther from
both the administrative and protected areas to
prevent unauthorized access to them.

Protected Area

Weaknesses

Proposed corrective actions

1. Fences surrounding the protected area are only
2.5 meters high.

1. The protected area should be ringed by two
parallel fences of a 3-meter (minimum) height
and topped with strands of barbed wire, the inner
fence providing a physical barrier to prevent
unauthorized access and supplemented by
intrusion detection equipment. The outer fence
reduces false alarms triggered by people or
animals [4].

2. Patrol inside the perimeter of the protected
area is conducted by only one guard on foot,
which is not extensive enough for such a
sensitive area.

2. Guards should patrol the protected area at
scheduled hours, but should also patrol the area
at unscheduled hours to prevent an adversary’s
calculations [5].

3. Unauthorized access can occur during work
hours, since access points are always open
throughout the week.

3. Identity of authorized persons entering the PA
should be verified; passes or badges should be
issued and visibly displayed inside the PA.

4. The VIP parking area is located inside the
protected area.

4. • The parking area—including VIP parking—
should be located far from both the
administrative and protected areas.
• Portal display monitors should be installed in
conjunction with physical protection systems so
that portals are properly staffed for surveillance
and detection [6].
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• To prevent unauthorized vehicles from
entering the facility, vehicle barriers should be
placed at a suitable distance from the inner area
[6].
• Effective physical protection systems
comprise three axes:
—Detection: requiring technical means, such as
intrusion sensing and access control.
—Delay, using barriers, response forces, and
distance.
—Responses which will be driven by
professional security staff and an off-site law
enforcement body [3].
• The central alarm station (CAS) should
always be staffed for monitoring and evaluating
alarms and should ensure communication
throughout the facility with the response guards
[6].
• The central alarm station should be secured
in such a way that acquired information won’t be
lost or altered in the event of a threat.
• An uninterruptible power supply should be
provided and protected against unauthorized
manipulation for the CAS, communication, and
alarm equipment [6].
5. The cafeteria is located the protected area,
which leads to unauthorized personnel regularly
entering and exiting the PA.

5. The cafeteria should not be located within the
protected area, so as to minimize unauthorized
access to the area.

6. The road and rail transportation terminus is
located within the PA, which is neither secure
nor safe, even with robust security measures, thus
placing the entire site in danger.

6. Security measures for shipping and receiving
materials should be kept to the shipping and
receiving building.

1.

Fuel Fabrication and Reactor Building

Weaknesses

Proposed corrective actions

1. Oxides stored on open shelves in the fuel
fabrication building, as well as experiment
materials in room R091 (Fig. 4) in the reactor
building, can easily be stolen in the event of
unauthorized access.

1. Material containers placed on open shelves
should be caged in order to increase the time
required for completing malicious acts.
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Fig. Caged Material
2. The main entry doors are made of regular
glass; an offender could easily break in.

2. Doors should be made of bullet-resistant glass,
not regular glass.

3. There are no alarms in the offices or sensors
on the office doors in off-hours, and an intrusion
therefore wouldn’t be detected.

3. Tamper indicating devices (TIDs) should be
installed on critical cabinets.

4. Information showcased in the foyer in the fuel
fabrication building could help an adversary to
carry out malicious acts.

4. Site details shouldn’t be displayed, even for
visiting dignitaries.

5. There is no metal or nuclear material detector
at the emergency exit of fuel fabrication
building’s administrative area.

5. Tampering emergency doors should be
installed at the reactor and fuel fabrication
buildings.

6. Room R091 is next to the personnel
emergency exit door; in the event of emergency,
unauthorized theft from the room could be
carried out by an insider.

6. Separate the emergency door from the
shipping door to avoid material being removed in
the event of an emergency.

7. No CCTV cameras are installed at vital areas
to record entering and exiting personnel.

7. • Install CCTV cameras covering the main
entrance and the reactor shipping/receiving door.
Install an additional CCTV camera to cover the
entrance to the fuel fabrication building (Fig. 5).
• The live camera should be monitored inside
vital areas, with the option of recording.
• All individuals requiring access to the reactor
hall should be vetted, including students during
pedagogical visits from universities—who should
submit request forms to the national regulator.
• Temporary personnel with access to the
facility, such as visitors or construction workers,
should be escorted to ensure security [5].
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2.

NMAC organization

Weaknesses

Proposed corrective actions

1. • A single individual is assigned the
responsibility for technical coordination of the
overall NMAC programs; the individual could
manipulate the system without being detected.

1. • Apply the “two-person rule,” which requires
that two qualified individuals work together at
the same time and location at all times. This rule
provides a high level of security to attractive
nuclear material and can serve as a means for
detection [5].

• The measurement control coordinator is the
only person able to verify the measurement
equipment; not applying the two-person rule
would make it difficult to detect manipulation.
• The two-person rule is not applied to samples
of category III, thus increasing the chance of an
insider carrying out unauthorized action.

• Account for and control all materials by use
of an inventory. Any detected inconsistencies
should be reported to the facility manager
• Conduct quality assessments of the NMAC
system, including normal operation and
emergency conditions [7].
• Apply the graded approach: as consequences
increase, a high level of protection is needed [8].
• Raise awareness about nuclear security
culture through trainings and drills.
• Conduct a continuous improvement plan
process to learn from past incidents.

2. The SNRI has eight (8) Material Balance
Areas (MBAs), but all accountable nuclear
material is maintained in just one of them.

3.

2. Keep an inventory of all nuclear material at the
SNRI at each MBA, with each having its own
Key Measurement Points (KMPs).

Contraband detection equipment

Weaknesses

Proposed corrective actions

1. • The health physics personnel make any
required adjustments to equipment, as the
technical unit does not receive training in nuclear
detection equipment; the health physics
personnel could manipulate the detection systems
for later intrusion.

1. • Keep records of all personnel with access to
or possession of keys or systems that control
access to areas where nuclear material exist [6].
• Train personnel undertaking responsibilities
of sensitive positions such as radiation control.

• The head of the health physics department locks
the key to the radiation portal monitor control
and sensitivity adjustment in a safe in his office;
the password to the safe could be guessed by the
unauthorized personnel, gaining access to the
key.
2. If the supervisor code is entered, several basic
sensitivity programs can be selected with one
keystroke.

2. Multiple barriers should be in place, which
would need to be passed before reaching
sensitive programs.
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4.

Shipping and receiving facility

Weaknesses

Proposed corrective actions

1. • Waste packages are transferred to the
shipping and receiving facility for later transfer
to the radioactive waste site; in the absence of
security guards, nuclear material could be
removed without being detected.

1. • Materials left at the shipping and receiving
facility while paperwork is finalized should be
monitored at all times.

• Oxide powders are often left in the shipping
and receiving facility for two to three hours while
the receiving paper work is completed; these
materials are checked by patrol guards every 30
minutes. Theft of material could occur in the
interims.

• Effective communication between all
entities with responsibility of assuring secure
transport (guards, response force, shipper, and
receiver) should be ensured.
• Separate the loading and unloading docks,
with security guards at each gate (Fig. 3).
• The warehouse manager office should be
located at the shipping and receiving facility to
monitor operations.
• Truckers should be escorted and separated
from sensitive materials.

D.

ICT Operations and Information Security:

Weaknesses

Proposed corrective actions

1.• The republic of Anshar’s nuclear regulator
does not yet have a regulation for information
and communication technology system; thus, the
responsibility falls on the plant operator. Not
having such a policy means that responsibilities
are not defined, and there is no outline of the
current requirements, operations,
interdependencies, risk, and control.

1. • The state should establish a policy for
information security under its legislative and
regulatory framework. This consists of outlining
a definition of information security, roles, and
responsibilities of all personnel dealing with
sensitive information and risk management plan
based on a risk assessment approach conducted
by the state.
• Conduct periodic evaluation of the
procedures to ensure that they stay up-to-date
and to remind staff members of the importance
of adhering to the organization’s policy [9].
• Ensure that goals set by the organization are
regularly compared to results [9].
• Involve staff members in intellectual and
physical activities in order to avoid relying on
automation systems, which can put humans in
dangerous situations.

2. • The unavailability of analog spares forces the
Shapash reactor team to shift toward digital
information and communication security
systems, and not having enough training during
transition from analog to digital would increase
the likelihood of intrusion into the site’s
information system.

2. • The technical unit should undergo training
during the transition from analog to digital
systems.
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3. • The cyber security manager and the system
administrator are the only personnel with access
to all networks, making it difficult to detect any
manipulation.

3. • Apply the “two-person rule” for sensitive
positions, such as cyber security management.

4. • The operating group adds and removes users
and users’ rights on behalf of the responsible
party in each section, which would give them the
advantage of manipulating information.

4. • Only approved and qualified users should
be allowed to make modifications to the
systems [10].
• Passwords should be changed frequently,
and multiple barriers to reaching information
should be applied.
• Modifications and updates to hardware or
software systems should be made based on an
administrative procedure.

5. • Electronics engineers should be hired, but
because of long-term contracts with present staff,
no additional employees can be hired; hence,
external skills have to be contacted, which means
more unnecessary access to the site.

5. • Implement a career enhancement policy for
all employees within the organization, and
evaluate the current positions’ importance so as
to have more opportunities for hiring personnel
with requisite skills.
• Prior to employment, potential employees
should go through identity and background
checks and generic medical and psychological
assessments, as well as checks of all declared
degrees.

6. • The SNRI have experienced hacking
attempts reported by the computer engineering
group.

6. • Ensure confidentiality, integrity, and
accessibility so as to protect information from
disclosure to unauthorized parties, modification,
and denied access [10].
• The computer security program must
include a rapid means of responding to
incidents—describing how to maintain the
ability to quickly detect and respond to
computer attacks, mitigate the consequences of
cyber-attacks, correct exploited vulnerabilities,
and restore affected systems, networks, and
equipment [10].
• Sensitive data should be backed up in at
least three different places.
• The classification of computer systems
should be taken into consideration when
defining the appropriate level of security to be
applied.
• Improve and enforce strict control over the
use of media and portable equipment. In the
case of USB drives, CDs, and laptops being
used to interface with the facility’s hardware,
measures should be in place to minimize the
threat of cyber-attacks, such as:
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—Minimize the use of devices not
maintained at the factory.
—Use virus detection devices both
before and after being connected to the
facility’s equipment.
—Implement additional security
measures for data that comes from sources or
devices not a part of the facility.
• Conduct security audit checks to help
review the facility security risks.
• Raise awareness about the importance of
maintaining the integrity of information by
reinforcing the computer security culture [10].
7. • All of the facility’s employees have access to
the operational documents of the nuclear process
in both physical and digital form; such access to
sensitive data could facilitate malicious activity
from the inside.

7. • Users should only have access to
information necessary for carrying out their
individual jobs.

IV. Alternative Site Layout:
The changes suggested in the corrective actions above are included in both layouts below.
The areas framed in red are ones modified in the new site layout; areas framed in blue in the new site
layout are modifications we’ve proposed.
Site Layout:
• The radioactive waste site is no longer within this area and is replaced by the cafeteria
originally located in the protected area; unauthorized personnel won’t have access to the
protective area, and the waste site will be more protected in the PA, a high-security area.
• The VIP parking area is no longer inside the PA and is separated from both the AA and PA.
• The access control building is located such that personnel and vehicles entering/exiting the
site will be inspected.
• Loading and unloading docks are separated at the shipping and receiving building.
• Both the outer and inner fences are 3 meters high.
The Research Reactor Building:
• The emergency exit is separated from the shipping door and covered by a CCTV camera. The
control room has been added (Fig. 5) with the purpose of controlling material shipped in and
out of the research reactor building.
• The nuclear materials placed in room R091 on open shelves are caged; this modification will
serve as a delay measure in case of unauthorized access to the building.
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The site layout as described in the data book:

Figure 1: The Site Layout as Described in the Data Book
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The new site layout:

Figure 2: The New Site Layout
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The research reactor as described in the data book:

Figure 3: Research Reactor Building Floor Plan
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The new research reactor building floor plan:

Figure 4: The New Research Reactor Building Floor Plan

V.

Conclusion

We have used the Hypothetical Facility Data Book: The Shapash Nuclear Security Research Institute
(SNRI) as an educational tool to put theoretical nuclear security knowledge into practice. We believe
that working on this data book allows for the development of critical thinking skills that are needed in
the field of nuclear security. In this paper we identified many different security measures and their
weaknesses related to the institute’s location, the Administrative Area, the Protected Area, and the
Instrumentation and Control Technology system within the SNRI. We proposed corrective actions to
improve the site’s protections against malicious acts, as well as a new layout for the whole site and the
research reactor building, presenting the changes made using a software called Edraw Max.
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